Refiguring the Self through the Other:
The Specular Function of Mimicry in Shakespeare, Marivaux and Tieck
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In the performance situation, dramatic figures engage in the ludic activity of mimicry by playing roles in the presence of other figures who function, passively or actively, as audience. To recast this in more ontologically weighted terms, the performance situation presents the process by which the subject (actor), in representing the self-as-other (character), submits to a self-dispossession, and expropriates and appropriates otherness as its own in its directedness toward others (audience). Certain playwrights have foregrounded this fundamental play-structure and drawn attention to its ontological, cognitive and affective implications. On the one hand, then, the performance situation focalizes issues related to identity construction in a situation of alterity (ipse-identity) for the reason that it entails a radical cleavage of the subject into a for-itself and a representation-for-others; otherness thus is introduced into the definition of subjective self-sameness (idem-identity) resulting in a fundamental non-coincidence of the self with itself. On the other hand, it may be put to the service of effecting an autoscopy, or «self-seeing,» on the part of the spectator either internal to the performance who «stands in» for the spectator of the play, or external, by intentionally implicating the theatre audience in its workings. Autoscopy, it should be emphasized, is not merely an antic (i.e., physical, episodic) event, as, say, in the body’s reflection in a mirror. More, it is an epistemological and
ontological event that is constitutive of the spectator's selfhood in a fundamental way: seeing the self in the other and the resultant increase in self-understanding potentially bring about a critical (and reflexive) transformation, or «refiguration» in the spectator's subjective modes of knowing and being. Autoscopy is, thus, the condition for a self-examination, or autopsy, which has the double, henneneutical meaning of «seeing-for-the-self» and «finding-for-the-self.»

This autoscopic, or specular, potency of mimicry is foregrounded to interesting effect in William Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida* (160111603), Pierre Carlet de Chamblain de Marivaux's *L'Ile des esclaves* (1725, *Slave Island*) and Ludwig Tieck's *Die verkehrte Welt* (1798, *The World in Reverse*). By presenting performance situations in which the spectators are subjected to an «ontological catastrophe»-Le., they are transformed from «pure-seer» (subject) into «pure-being-seen» (object)-these plays contain within themselves a heuristic model for the play-audience hermeneutical relation. Each of the plays makes productive use of the distanciation effected by historical (*Troilus and Cressida*), geographical (*L'Ile des esclaves*) and mythological or «representational» (*Die verkehrte Welt*) alterity to represent the contemporary ethos for the purpose of holding a henneneutical mirror up to ages, and audiences, in dire need of self-reflection: the representation of otherness, through the laws of reversibility in the specular playspace, is to be recognized as self-representation.

William Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida* is set during the siege of Troy and traces the legendary lovers' courtship, the consummation of their love and Cressida's ultimate betrayal of TroUus. Using the strategy of the performance situation, Shakespeare takes the play's theme of sexual inconstancy as a pretext for examining the ontological question of self-inconstancy and the impossibility of establishing a stable, coherent self-identity in a world in which the traditional moral and ideological value structures (Le., those of the chivalric code) are continually subverted and cancelled in a movement toward «a vision of universal whoredom»-that is, toward a world conceived as a «universal marketplace» where the value of anyone or anything is a function of the need and judgment of the buyer on a given day. Here, then, value is not an absolute for-itself but a relative for-others. Similarly, when who one is or "what one is worth is reflected in the eyes of the other, identity, of consequence, must be a constantly changing thing dependent on the other who is also constantly changing.

In a game of show-and-tell, Shakespeare sets up demonstrative and discursive performance situations that give play to changing audience perspectives and show, the consequences for the formation of the subject. These situations present dramatic figures either gazing at, or subjected to the interpreting, authorizing, formative gaze of the other. Furthermore, the gaze assumes a specular function:
by turning a dramatic figure into a spectacle, it provokes self-reflection, self-knowledge, on the part of either the spectated object (who, narcissistically, sees himself being seen) or the spectator (who sees himself in the other).

A key sequence begins with Ulysses' description of Patroclus' travestied verbal and gestural mimicry of the Agamemnon, Nestor and the other Greek generals for Achilles' private entertainment (I.iii.146-78). Ulysses' verbal description, hinging as it does on the basic gesturality of language in theatre, is demonstration, is itself a performance that functions reflexively: the goal of Ulysses' verbal re-enactment (mimicry) of a travesty (mimed 'enactment) of the Greek leadership is to show to the object of the original travesty and the audience of the re-enactment the rampant anarchy in the Greek camp that has been aggravated by the generals' disregard and so, in making them re-gard, to put them en garde and prompt them to act.'

This scene stands as precursive to the one in which Ulysses, relinquishing his role as actor, directs those same Greek generals to pass by and pretend to ignore Achilles, after which he, in the guise of interpreter, will explain to Achilles that which was shown to him. Ulysses tels Agamemnon:

*Achilles stands i' th' entrance of his tent.*
*Please it our general to pass strangely by him,*
*As if he were forgot: and, princes all,*
*Lay negligent and loose regard upon him.*
*I will come last. 'Tis like he'll question me*  
*Why such unplausive eyes are bent, why turn'd on him.*
*If so, I have derision medicinable*  
*To use between your strangeness and his pride,*
*Which his own will shall have desire to drink.*
*It may do good: pride hath no other glass*  
*To show itself but pride; for supple knees*  
*Feed arrogance, and are the proud man's fees.*

(III.iii.38-49)

The intent behind this rather juvenile display of arrogance on the part of the legendary warriors is, via the specular function of the gaze, to make Achilles cognizant that he has grown arrogant and, in his arrogance, slothful: he has stuck himself in his heroic image by relying on past deeds to affirm his present status. By thus turning a mirror onto Achilles, Ulysses would show Achilles that reputation—or how one is known and valued by others—is not intrinsic and constant, and in doing so, would provoke the hero to an encore heroic performance.
A discursive exchange between Ulysses and Achilles follows the show put on by the generals. The exchange employs the visual and verbal metaphors of reflection (mirror, echo), just as Ulysses uses the discursive (explanation) to buttress the generals' visual display. The key theme is the necessary presence of other persons to provide the means by which one may see, know and/or affirm one's own self-identity:

ULYSSES-A strange fellow here
Writes me, that man, how dearly ever parted,
How much in having, or without or in,
Cannot make boast to have that which he hath,
Nor feels not what he owes but by reflection.
As, when his virtues aiming upon others
Heat them, and they retort that heat again
To the first giver.

ACHILLES-This is not strange, Ulysses.
The beauty that is borne here in the face
The bearer knows not, but commends itself
To others' eyes; nor doth the eye itself,
That most pure spirit of sense, behold itself,
Not going from itself; but eye to eye opposed
Salutes each other with each other's form;
For speculation turns not to itself
Till it hath travel'd and is mirror'd there
Where it may see itself This is not strange at all.

ULYSSES- ...
That no man is the lord of anything,
Though in and of him there be much consisting,
Till he communicate his parts to others;
Nor doth he of himself know them for aught,
Till he behold them form'd in the applause
Where th'are extended; who, like an arch, reverb'rate
The voice again; or, like a gate of steel
Fronting the sun, receives and renders back
His figure and his heat. (III,iii.95-123)

The basic argument of this exchange is that it is the confrontation with other persons that constitutes the decisive advent for self-seeing in the dual sense of perception (seeing) and cognition (knowing). The gaze, then, serves to concep-
tualize the process whereby human beings are constituted in their outer appearance and inner possessions or worth, and, in thus being known by others, come to know themselves more fully. To borrow Bakhtin's terms, which seem to echo Shakespeare's discourse, the activity of in-forming the self about the self can only take place by the «excess of seeing»-or surplus of visual data-on the part of the other-gazer, who then affirms or completes the self through the bestowal of a «consummatmg farm.»

A second key sequence in which the spectator-spectated interplay functions specularly begins with the infamous assignation scene wherein Cressida betrays Troilus to Diomedes (V,2). Here, Shakespeare sets up an intricate web which ultimately implicates the spectators of Troilus and Cressida. Unbeknownst to Cressida and Diomedes, Troilus has convinced Ulysses to escort him into the Greek camp, and the two look on the scene and comment on the action. Unbeknownst to Troilus and Ulysses, Thersites has followed them and, similarly, comments on both the assignation and Troilus' reaction to the scene. Shakespeare effectively puts the spectator in motion in order to achieve multiple viewpoints on a given subject matter: the different positions of the speaking eavesdroppers create diverse degrees of involvement with and judgments about Cressida and the dramatic action. Where Douglas Sprigg regards this set-up functionally as «a series of mutually informing plays within plays, each with its own drama of reference» in order to ensure «that the slightest response from the upstage couple (Cressida and Diomedes) will be magnified by a chain reaction of responses from the series of eavesdroppers,» Richard Snyder interprets this situation as a «satire on audience reaction itself»-from the «seething cynicism» of Thersites to the «bland worldly acceptance» of Ulysses and the «untested naivete and self-righteousness» of Troilus.

While these assessments are sound and justifiable, I think that a slightly different focus is needed, one that takes into consideration the play's overall concern with the value/identity of an individual as a function of the other. Bakhtin explains that «a value-judgment about one and the same person that is identical in its content ('he is bad') may have different actual intonations, depending on the actual, concrete center of values in the given circumstances.» In other words, then, the attempt to cast Cressida in varying colorations of falsity actually reveals more about the prejudgments and values of the interpreters than it does about the object of interpretation-namely, Cressida, a self-acknowledged self-divided figure who, in the course of the play, comes to exist solely in the condition of performer, as a multiplicity of representations for others. As a consequence, Cressida comes to stand, first, as a blank slate, overlaid with individualized and concrete features of others,
variously written and constituted by others as false; 13 second, as a glass which reflexively rebounds back onto the interpreter.

If, as is done here, the performer is constituted as a whore, then the spectators are voyeurs—as Troilus nominates himself, her «merchants» (I,i.100-05)—who set her price on a given market day. The assignation scene, by implicating the spectator self-reflexively in the interpretation of the actions of the performer-prostitute, is linked to Pandarus’ final address to the audience, which is similarly implicated in this universal flesh market: the pandar refers to the audience in terms of himself as «Good traders in the flesh» (V,x.46) and «Brethren and sisters of the hold-door trade» (V,x.52) and would «bequeath» to them his «diseases» (V,x.57), no doubt sexually contracted. This address, then, takes on a prospectively hermeneutical cast. Just as Cressida, existing purely as a for-others, evokes a number of audience reactions that reveal more about the interpreter, so the self-same text of *Troilus and Cressida*, belonging to the repertoire of Shakespeare’s so-called «problem plays,» has produced a critical history or marketplace full of dissenting interpretations and judgments, especially as regards to its «value» as a work of art—a history that speaks not only to the polysemic nature of the work of art, to its openness to a multiplicity of interpretive disclosures, but moreover, to the interpretive nature of perceptions and judgments themselves and to the particular questions or evaluative presuppositions guiding a given line of critical inquiry.

Marivaux’s *L’île des esclaves* belongs to the repertoire of eighteenth-century literary works portraying a social utopia. On the one hand, geographical distanciation—achieved by the depiction of an imaginary domain situated in a geographically imprecise region—allows a neutral, prototypical arena to be established for the purpose of social experimentation. On the other, Slave Island is very much a «world-in-reverse» that provides a topos for presenting, for a didactic purpose, contemporary issues of social hierarchy and human nature.

On Slave Island, the descendants of escaped Greek slaves have established an egalitarian republic in which servitude is abolished. Should masters ever find themselves upon this rock, the inhabitants either enslave or kill them until or unless they mend their ways. After a shipwreck, the islanders capture Iphicrate, a young Athenian nobleman who is accompanied by his slave, Arlequin, and Euphrosine, an Athenian coquette, along with her maid, Cleanthis. Trivelin, the democratic ruler of the island, puts both masters and servants to a test by having them exchange roles with one another. This exchange is designed to «heal» the castaways and make them «humains, raisonnables et généreux pour toute [leur] vie» (<<humane, rational and empathetic for the rest of their life>>) Marivaux (1968, 11.522). Though it is primarily the masters who must be reformed, both masters
and servants come to recognize the errors of their respective ways. As Trivelin concludes (11.542): «La différence des conditions n’est qu’une épreuve que les dieux font sur nous» («The difference in condition is only a test. a task that the gods have set for us»).

In this play, Marivaux anticipates and participates in Enlightenment discussions regarding social inequality and injustice. Briefly, Enlightenment philosophy understood its task, not as «an act of destruction,» but as «an act of reconstruction,» the goal of which was «the restitution to the whole (restitutio in integrum)» by which «reason and humanity are re-installed in their ancient rights» Cassirer (1979, 234). This task of reconstruction, then, is extended to human beings and the society into which they are inextricably thrown. It also grounds the central doctrine formulated by the thinker who epitomized Enlightenment thought in the 1860s, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

As in L’île des esclaves, in which the inherent goodness of the servants is constantly emphasized and where social injustice is treated as a malady that must be cured, Rousseau's great principle, articulated more than a century later, is that human beings, essentially good, have the wherewithal to transform themselves into good citizens in a good society Lanson (1903, 774-75). Positing a relation of mutual dependency between human beings and society, he argues that society, which has not been built on natural principles, makes the human being bad; however, since the human being cannot escape society and return to a state of nature, the recreation of society is the necessary precondition for humanity's recreation and self-perfection.

The means to accomplish this goal lies in reason. Reason-conceived functionally as «the original intellectual force which guides the discovery and determination of truth» alone appeals to the processes of self-knowledge and genuine self-examination which are a priori to the recreation and perfection of the self. As Ernst Cassirer (1989) discusses with respect to Rousseau's Emile in terms of sense experience, and to his «Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard» in terms of spiritual experience...

... genuine insight is acquired by everyone for himself. It is the pupil's business to create this insight within himself, not the educator's to plant it in him. ... The postulate of autopsy [-I.e. the axiom of seeing-for-yourself and finding-for-yourself-] is transformed into the postulate of autonomy. All truly ethical and religious conviction must be based on it; all ethical instruction, all religious teaching, remains altogether ineffective and sterile unless it confines itself from the outset to the purpose of pointing the way to the goal of self-knowledge and self-understanding. (118-119)
In *L’Île des esclaves*, the test that the masters and servants must undergo, hinges on the expropriation (by Trivelin) and appropriation (by the servants) or imposition (upon the masters) of the identity of the masters' and servants' respective other. This process is accomplished functionally by the exchange of names (Iphicrare and Arlequin; Euphrosine and Cléanthis), roles (master and slave), garments and emblems of the station. It has the symbolic goal of creating empathy by actually placing the self in the position of the other. Through the ensuing representation-of-self-as-other (mimicry) and through the reciprocal seeing-of-and-confrontation-with-the-self in the mimicry of the other (resemblance) and the self-examination occasioned thereby, the characters would come to know themselves for themselves. In other words, Trivelin and the recreated society of Slave Island present the conditions for the possibility for these strangers to realize for themselves. Directing his comments about Euphrosine to Cléanthis, Trivelin says (III.71-75), «Venons maintenant à l’examen de son caractere: il est necessaire que vous m’en donniez un portrait, qui se doit faire devant la personne qu’on peint, afin qu’elle se connaisse, qu’elle rougisse de ses ridicules, si elle en a, et qu’elle se corrige» (“Let’s examine her character: it is necessary that you give me a portrait in front of the person whom you paint so that she will know herself, blush at her idiocies should she have any, and correct herself”); and to Euphrosine (IV.17-20), «On espéra que, vous étant reconnue, vous abjurerez un jour toutes ces folies qui font qu’on n’aime que soi, et qui ont distrait votre bon cœur d’une infinite d’attentions plus louables» (“Let’s hope that, having recognized yourself, you will in time come to renounce all your follies which make you love only yourself and which distract your good heart from an infinity of more laudable concerns”).

Marivaux theatricalizes the pedagogical method for self-recreation and self-perfection. That is, as does Shakespeare in *Troilus and Cressida*, Marivaux plays a game of show-and-tell, or seeing-and-saying, in order to lay the foundation internally for the benefit of the masters and externally for the benefit of the contemporary audience—for gaining, with ever increasing clarity and knowledge, insight into the grounds and origins of social abuses. First, the servants «paint» a verbal «portrait» (III.72-73) of the masters, which the masters must acknowledge as an accurate and true resemblance. So, Cléanthis describes a vain, flirtatious and coy Euphrosine (III), and Arlequin, a brutal, violent, foolish Iphicratae (V). Second, after the verbal venting of «resentment» (II.70), the servants engage in the performative or «spectacular» miming of the masters by enacting various love games played by high society. Cléanthis and Arlequin direct one another on how to play the roles of gentleman and lady, feed each other the appropriate lines, gestures and attitudes; occasionally, in a show of overt self-
Through the ludic activity of mimicry, both masters and servants see the errors of their own ways: seized by an act of conscience, they understand the dishonourable way that they have treated one another. When each has seen herself for what she is and experiences the shame that self-knowledge brings, a refiguration of self and social class—or shattering of conditioned social enframings through the coming to critical self-consciousness of one's own prejudices—is effected and the true, good nature of the human being (characterized by decency, kindness and rationality), is reinstated: the oppressors who, in the exchange, came to be oppressed, learn the humility and kindness that the servants, on assuming the role of master, had demonstrated; the servants learn patience and respect for their superiors. After a scene of four-fold self-recognition, mutual understanding, avowal of sins, repentance and forgiveness, then, the castaways resume their «natural» or previous positions, but (in the fashion of the hermeneutic spiral) with the important difference that the social relations between master and servant will be re-created, «democratized» within the broader limits prescribed by society (that is, Marivaux does not go so far as to suggest a complete recreation and democratization of social relations).

In line with Shakespeare and influenced by the commedia dell'arle as it came to Germany via the eighteenth-century France of Marivaux, Ludwig Tieck belonged to the influential Jena School of early German Romanticism (1799-1801), which counted among its members the critics, Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel. His masterpieces, Der gestiefelte Kater (1797, Puss 'n Boots) and Die verkehrte Welt, which satirize contemporary Enlightenment literary, moral and political attitudes by the mise-en-scene of societal representatives as audience to a Romantic play, can be viewed as the elaboration in the poetic and visual realms of the transcendental turn that hermeneutic thought, fuelled by Immanuel Kant's Copernican Revolution—i.e., the radical turning away from the thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich) as the object of cognition and turning toward the subject and the subject's mode of knowing objects^{18}—underwent at the time.

Without going into a lengthy exposition of the aesthetic and philosophical program of the early German Romantics, or becoming embroiled in the debate on the (in)appropriateness of applying their theories to Tieck's work,^{19} and at the risk of greatly eliding complex issues, I will limit the discussion to a few remarks that are pertinent to the work at hand. In their own turn away from nature and toward the human being,^{20} the early German Romantics laid the groundwork for harnessing the power of the reflexive faculty to the goal of attaining a new level of self-understanding. In literary works of art, the turn toward the subject entailed
a revisioning of the concept of art away from the notion that it should produce only a complete illusion and toward a duality involving an interplay between the creation or affirmation of illusionism, and its destruction or negation. In other words, there was an understanding that poetic discourse should, through its representations, also represent or reflect back on itself.\textsuperscript{21} It should include its own critique.\textsuperscript{22} Glossing F. Schlegel's comment in \textit{Gespräch aber die Poesie} (\textit{Discourse About Poetry}) that «[t]he inner representation [Vorstellung] can become clearer to itself and quite alive only through the external representation [Darstellung],» Azade Seyhan (1992) explains that, for the Romantics, the figural or representational form (\textit{Darstellungsform}) became «the medium of the reflective function» and, through this, «the medium of knowledge constituted in reflection» (8). The Romantics thus incorporated a critical praxis in the work of art with the goal of, first, reflexively, making the audience conscious of the \textit{Schein} or \textit{Spiel} and, second, self-reflexively, promoting self-awareness.

In fragment #116 of the \textit{Antheneum}, Friedrich Schlegel defines Romantic poetry in a way that suggests a link with a particular form of the performance situation-the play-within-the-play-especially as employed by Tieck in \textit{Die verkehrte Welt}:

[\textit{Romantic poetry}] alone can become, like the epic, a mirror of the whole circumambient world, an image of the age. And it can also ... hover at the midpoint between the portrayed [Dargestellten] and the portrayer [Darstellenden] ... on the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise the reflection again and again to a higher power, can multiply it in an endless succession of mirrors. It is capable of the highest and most variegated \textit{refinement}, not only from within outwards, but also from without inwards; capable in that it organizes for everything that seeks a wholeness in its effects-the parts along similar \textit{lines}, so that it opens up a perspective upon an infinitely increasing classicism. (31-32)

There are three major points made here: first, the representational power of Romantic poetry to hold a mirror up to the contemporary world; second, the inscription within the representational form of a critique or reflection on it; third, in terms of structure, the repetition of a given content of the whole in the \textit{parts} (specular \textit{duplication}).

Fritz Strich (1949, 295) discusses the connection between this definition of Romantic poetry and Tieck's version of the play-within-the-play:

\textit{The spectators experience themselves as doubled and become their own spectator. The spectators cast their own gaze upon themselves and not}
upon the space. This reflexivity [Spiegelung] can be multiplied at will. In Die verkehrte Welt, a theatre play is played out once more within the play-within-the-play: the reflected image [Spiegelbild] is reflected one more time in a mirror [Spiegel]. It is like Friedrich Schlegel's formula: the Romantic spirit implies an infinite reflexion [Reflexion], an infinite reflexivity [Spiegelung] of reflected images [Spiegelbild].

Strich appropriately focuses on the effect of the *mise-en-abyme* structural fonn, not only to draw the spectators into the theatrical space by the internal representation/duplication of the audience, but more importantly, in a reflex, to reflect back onto the spectators themselves and, hence, to occasion, in the specular move, a self-seeing.

In one sequence (III,v), through the strategy of the performance situation *en abyme*, the schema of duplicating identity as difference and of doubling the self, through the creation of *Personenkonstellation* (<<character-constellations>>) and for the purpose of achieving an insight into the self, is repeated *ad infinitum*. The dramatic situation is as follows. *Die verkehrte Welt* tells the story of how the comic actor, Skaramuz (Scaramuccio), overturned the serious character, Apollo, and how Apollo, along with the audience, tried and failed to regain control of the theatre. This is the *play-within-the-play* (or second degree play), for which the first degree play is the audience composed of Scavola, initially Grtinhelm and then Pierrot, Wachtel and others representing Enlightenment society. In this second degree play, Skaramuz-as-Apollo has forbidden Melpomene (his tragic muse who, before assuming this role, was called Caroline) to leave Parnassus and marry her lover, the Stranger. Along with some guests, he sits down to watch a masquerade staged by Melpomene and the Stranger, all the while the audience of the first degree play watches and comments. The intent of staging this third degree play is to represent their own situation so as to influence Skaramuz-as-Apollo to change his decision about keeping Caroline-as-Melpomene. So, Caroline-as-Melpomene and the Stranger assume the roles of others (those of Emily and the Young Man) in order to play themselves, while someone else plays the Father who represents Skaramuz-as-Apollo. As in *Troilus and Cressida* and *L'fle des esclaves*, where the spectator watches her/himself being staged, then, here Skaramuz-as-Apollo watches himself being represented. The parallel between Skaramuz-as-Apollo and the Father of the third degree play is made abundantly clear when it is mentioned that there is a play being staged on both levels to honour the respective patriarch's birthday (ill,v.77-78). That is, the Stranger-as-Young-Man and Caroline-as-Melpomene-as-Emily stage a fourth degree play in a small theatre to entertain Emily's father and a group of guests. In this fourth degree play, the Stranger-as-Young-Man plays Fernando, and Caroline-as-Melpomene-
as-Emily plays Laura. This fourth degree play is directed toward the Father for the purpose of affecting him so that they can confess their love for one another to him. The Stranger-as-Young-Man lays bare their strategy as being to represent their own situation to the Father who, in being enlightened, will give the children his blessing (III, v.125-27): «Wir wollen ihm durch ein Schauspiel Freude machen, und wir benutzen dieses Schauspiel, uns und unsere Situation darzustellen» («We wish to give him pleasure by staging a play, and we use this play to represent ourselves and our situation»). So, again, while the Father watches on, the lovers represent themselves by playing the other, while the Father is represented by another, here Claudio. This fourth degree play, a poetic drama, is composed of two analogous and self-reflecting parts: first, a pastoral, in which a shepherd and shepherdess confess their love for one another; second, Laura’s and Fernando’s tragic situation of a cruel father who forbids them to marry. This portrayal of the father figure, Claudio, causes the Father of the third degree play to say that, were he Claudio, he would give his consent to the lovers. The Father permits Emily and the Young Man to marry, an act with which Skaramuz-as-Apollo (in the second degree play) agrees, though his reasoning is less self-enlightened than self-serving as he is hungry. At the end of this sequence, Skaramuz-as-Apollo does allow Caroline-as-Melpomene to leave the theatre (Parnassus) and marry the Stranger.

On the one hand, then, the audience is presented with the abysmal turning in of the spectacle on itself by the specular reduplication of structural, thematic, figural and situational elements belonging to the respective outer play in the inner. On the other, there is a turning back outward of the spectacle on the spectator. This outward movement is effected by shattering the frames of the plays-within-the-plays when the characters of one play level cross over to the next outer level-what Schmeling, in Das Spiel im Spiel, calls Aus-der-Rolle-Fallen («falling-out-of-the-role»). So, at the critical point, Fernando (fourth degree character) tells the third degree character, Emily (and not his corresponding fourth degree lover, Laura), to beg, not the-Father (third degree character), before whom Emily has already fallen on her knees and who would give the children his blessing, but Skaramuz-as-Apollo (second degree character).

The staging of a series of analogical situations functions to promote self-understanding by reflexively demonstrating the very process of attaining it. In other words, at the second and third degree plays, a change in the target spectator (respectively, Skaramuz-Apollo and the Father) is effected by showing the spectator a representation of himself: the spectator, watching himself-as-another, comes to see the other as a representation of himself. By reflecting on the posited spectacle, on the Spiel, and through the self-reflexivity occasioned by difference
(other-as-self), the target spectator appropriates otherness as his own and gains self-understanding (namely, that he has been behaving like a tyrant).

By analogy, given the series of increasingly grotesque audiences represented in this sequence, this turning back on the target spectator involves the other spectators in a seemingly infinite self-reflexivity. The spectators experience themselves as, first, multiplied numerically in the manifold representations of spectators to the plays-within-plays and, second, as ontologically doubled, being both subject and object of the spectacle. This situation is made explicit in the course of the third act when the first degree spectators comment on the dramatic form of the play-within-the-play of which they are a part and which is the very strategy used in Die verkehrte Welt:

SCÄVOLA—Leute, bedenkt einmal, wie wunderbar! Wir sind hier die Zuschauer, und dorten sitzen die Leute nun auch als Zuschauer.
PIERROT—Es steckt immer so ein Stuck im andern. (II1;v.86-89)

(SCAVOLA-People, just think, how wonderful! Here we are spectators, and there sit people who are also spectators.
PIERROT-A play always has another one inserted in it.)

At the end of the sequence, the first degree spectators provide a further gloss on what has just taken place on stage in a way that points outward toward the theatre audience of Die verkehrte Welt and begins to destabilize the final bamer between the fields of play and reality, thus anticipating the twentieth-century obsession with the interpenetration of fiction and reality as attested by the works of Luigi Pirandello, Jean Genet, Peter Handke and Peter Weiss:

SCÄYOLA—Es ist gar ZU toll. Seht, Leute, wir sitzen hier als Zuschauer und sehn ein Stuck; in jenem Stuck sitzen wieder Zuschauer und sehn ein Stuck, und in jenem dritten Stuck wird jenen dritten Akteurs wieder ein Stuck vorgespielt.

DER ANDRE—Nun denkt euch, Leute, wie es möglich ist, daß wir wiederAkteurs in irgendeinem Stücke waren, und einer sähe nun das Zeug so alles durcheinander! Das wäre doch die Konfusion aller Konfusionen. Wir sind noch glücklich, daß wir nicht in dieser bedaliernswurdigen Lage sind; denn es wäre nachher kaum möglich, sich aufgelinde Weise wieder in seinen allerersten vernunftigen Zustand zurückbringen zu lassen; ich fürchte, man mujJe mit Pulver wieder hineingesprengt werden.

(SCAVOLA-This is nuts. Look, here we are spectators, sitting watching a play; in this play, spectators sit watching a play, and in that play again spectators sit watching yet another play.

OTHERS-Say, could it be that we too are actors in that play, and that somebody saw the whole thing tangled up together. Wouldn’t that be the confusion of confusions; We’re lucky that we haven’t sunk to such a deplorable state for it would have been barely possible to return us to our former rational state; I fear it would have taken nothing less than gunpowder to bring us back to normal.

SCAVOLA-There are fearful dreams of this kind. And there are such thoughts that spiral and spiral deeper and deeper inward. And such dreams and such thoughts can drive you mad.)

As is the case with Skaramuz, who changes his mind only because he is hungry, so here the spectator’s «ontological catastrophe» is averted, being held up only as a negated possibility. Nevertheless, this exchange is designed to make the theatre audience aware that by reflecting upon an other, it may view «its own presence as representation» Seyhan (9).

Though the respective foci may differ, in Troilus and Cressida, L’Île des esclaves and Die verkehrte Welt, the performance situation is used as a heuristic model by which to conceptualize the hermeneutical relation between play and audience. Each play shows theatre as a relational process that takes profound account of alterity: by exploiting the autoscopic potency of mimicry, the works present situations in which the mess becomes an instrumental ingredient in the constitution or transformation of the self; the transforming experience which the spectators undergo is to condition their understanding of themselves and their world, and to influence their acting. Anticipating the shift in contemporary performance «from the stage to the auditorium of consciousness» by virtue of its intentional disorientation of its audience which necessarily makes of «vision a revisionary process,»26 these playwrights effectively ensnare their audience, implicating it as the other gazing at the represented spectacle. Theatre, consequently, is transformed into a specular playspace by which the spectators, in a reversal, recognize that they are the real ones for whom the play is brought to
presentation (cf Gadamer 1990, 109) that all along they have been looking into a mirror and become the spectacle, the «being-seen»-a situation which entails a radical re-and bi-figuring of the spectating subject into a for-itself and a for-others.

Notes

3. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's term (1968): «But this has no meaning for man taken as pure vision: he does indeed have the conviction of going unto the things themselves, but, surprised in the act of seeing, suddenly he becomes one of them, and there is no passage from one view to the other. Pure seer, he becomes a thing seen through an ontological catastrophe, through a pure event which is for him the impossible» (83).
4. Given the play's notorious inconsistencies, the sense of inconstancy can be viewed as functioning at various textual layers of plot, character, language and action. Recently these inconsistencies been co-opted, primarily by deconstructionists—a situation which has occasioned a re-valuation of this dramatic work. See the following: 1. Hillis Miller, «Ariachne's Broken Woof,» Georgia Review 31.1 (1977): 44-60; Lawrence Green, «'We'll dress him up in voices': The Rhetoric of Disjunction in Troilus and Cressida,» Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984): 23-40; William O. Scott, «Self-Difference in Troilus and Cressida,» Shakespeare and Deconstruction, eds. G. Douglas Atkins and David M. Bergeron. (New York: Peter Lang, 1988) 129-48.
6. Thomas Hobbes captures this sentiment in Leviathan (1981), in a passage strangely appropriate to the thematics of worth and value in Troilus and Cressida, and echoing Troilus' line, «What's aught but as 'tis valued?» (II,ii.53): «The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another.... And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price. For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest Value they can; yet their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others" (151-52). All citations from Troilus and Cressida are from the Arden edition and will be referenced in the text. Shakespeare (1991).
7. Linda Charnes (1989, 413-40), calls Achilles' tent the «site of subversive theatre,» because it is the «space where legendary texts are transgressed by performance and mime» (430). Elizabeth Freud (1985, 19-36), makes the apt point that, in this scene, given the vaunting by the Greek generals, we are not really certain if «the mimes cite, or quote, the characters of Nestor and Agamemnon, or the characters playing these figures cite the mimes» (31). That is, Patroclus' travesty may not be a travesty at all, but an accurate mimicry.
8. Mikhail Balchtin (1990) says: «(When I contemplate a whole human being who is situated outside and over against me, our concrete, actually experienced horizons do not coincide.»
For at each given moment, regardless of the position and proximity to me of this other human being whom I am contemplating, I shall always see and know something that he, from his place outside and over against me, cannot see himself: parts of his body that are inaccessible to his own gaze (his head, his face and its expression), the world behind his back, and a whole series of objects and relations, which in any of our mutual relations are accessible to me but not to him. As we gaze at each other, two different worlds are reflected in the pupils of our eyes. It is possible, upon assuming an appropriate position, to reduce this difference of horizons to a minimum, but in order to annihilate this difference completely, it would be necessary to merge into one, to become one and the same person (22-23); «The excess of my seeing is the bud in which slumbers form, and whence form unfolds like a blossom. But in order that this bud should really unfold into the blossom of consummating form, the excess of my seeing must 'fill in' the horizon of the other human being who is being contemplated, must render his horizon complete, without at the same time forfeiting his distinctiveness» (24).

11 Bakhtin (1993, 63).
12 Cressida forewarns Troilus: «I have a kind of self resides with you) But an unkind self, that itself willieavel To be another's fool» (III,ii.146-48). John Kopper (1988, 149-71), calls Cressida a «figure of heterology.»
13 As when Troilus examines her as a text, replacing her features, gestures, voice by material marks (I,i.54-57), or when Ulysses, badly trounced by the witty Cressida, reads her as a «wanton» «tablet,» a piece of pornography, whose function it is to titilate her readers (IV,v.55-63).
14 Marivaux (1968, II.522). All subsequent citations are from this edition and are referenced by scene and line in the text. The translations are mine.
15 Rousseau insists: «La nature humaine ne retrograde pas» («Human nature does not go back») Cf (287).
16 Here, Cassirer (1979) contrasts the conceptualization of reason in the eighteenth century with that prevailing in the seventeenth: «In the great metaphysical systems of [the seventeenth] century ... reason is the realm of the 'eternal verities,' of those truths held in common by the human and the divine mind .... Every act of reason means participation in the divine nature; it gives access to the intelligible world. The eighteenth century takes reason in a different and more modest sense. It is no longer the sum total of 'innate ideas' given prior to all experience, which reveal the absolute essence of things. Reason is now looked upon rather as an acquisition than as a heritage. It is not the treasury of the mind in which the truth like a minted coin lies stored; it is rather the original intellectual force which guides the disc(very and determination of truth. This determination is the seed and the indispensable presupposition of all real certainty. The whole eighteenth century understands reason in this sense; not as a sound body of knowledge, principles, and truths, but as a kind of energy, a force which is fully comprehensible only in its agency and effects. What reason is, and what it can do, can never be known by its results but only by its function. And its most important function consists in its power to bind and to dissolve» (13).
This is not the only play in which Marivaux uses the strategy of the exchanging of roles, as his other «philosophical» island plays demonstrate. In *L’île de la raison au Les petits hommes* (1727, *Isle of Reason, or The Little Men*), eight shipwrecked Europeans, accustomed to being 'les grands,' find themselves in the role of 'les petits' when confronted with the new morals and standards of the indigenous people (*Cf* Vol. 1 of *Théâtre complet*, 581-654); in *La Colonie* (1750, *The Colony*), among another group of shipwrecked individuals, a female coalition attempts to form a colony in which the roles and positions of the power might be reversed in relation to the previously dominating males (*Cj* 2 vols., 673-701), Even in his love comedies, characters assume other roles and guises, usually for the specific purpose of testing respective love partners (*e.g.*, *Le leu de l’amour et du hasard* [1730, *The Game of Love and Chance*] in Vol. 1 of *Théâtre complet*, 777-848).

«I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*» Kant (1990, 59). Kant’s basic argument is that we can never know the thing-in-itself prior to its synthesis by the various forms of intuition; of which he specifies time and space.

I would agree with Roger Paulin's assessment in *Ludwig Tieck: A Literary Biography* (New York: Oxford UP, 1985): «It would, however, be possible, and more reasonable also, to imagine a coincidence of ideas from the now converging areas of poetry and criticism, with Tieck’s poetic utterance, by nature reducing critical insight to essentials and at the same time expanding it in figure and image» (86). In particular, the appropriateness of applying Friedrich Schlegel's theory of romantic irony to Tieck's work has had its adherents and detractors, the former arguing for the convergence of ideas and their professional and personal association in the late 1700's, the latter arguing, chronologically, that F. Schlegel's work on romantic irony in Anthenaeum was published in the early 1800's, a few years after Tieck had already written *Der gestiefelte Kater* and *Die verkehrte Welt*. For discussions on these issues, see the following: Walter Sitz (1929); Glyn Tegai Hughes (1979); Manfred Schmeling (1982); Steven E. Alford (1984).

On this score, quoting August Wilhelm Schlegel (*Kritische Ausgabe der Vorlesungen*, Vol. I, eds. Ernst Behler and Frank Jolles [Paderborn: Schoningh, 1989] 259), Ernst Behler (1993) writes: «The clarity, the emphasis, the abundance, and manifoldness in which the universe mirrors itself in a human mind, and in which this mirroring mirrors itself in him, determines the degree of his artistic genius and enables him to form a world within the world,' The principle of imitation of nature turns into its contrary: 'In art, the human being is the norm of nature'» (1993, 86),

*Anthenæum Fragments* (tr. Peter Firchow [Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1991 D, writes: «It is a sublime taste always to like things better when they’ve been raised to the second power. For example, copies of imitations, critiques of reviews, addenda to additions, commentaries on notes» (31).

Friedrich Schlegel writes in #238 of the *Anthenæum Fragments*: «But just as we wouldn’t think much of an uncritical *transcendental* philosophy that doesn’t represent the producer along with the product and contain at the same time within the system of
transcendental thought a description of transcendental thinking: so too this sort of poetry should unite the transcendental raw materials and preliminaries of a theory of poetic activity ... with the artistic reflection and beautiful self-mirroring .... In all its descriptions, this poetry should describe itself, and always be simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry» (50-51).

23 My translation.
24 Manfred Schmeling's term (167).
25 As in the mirror image which repeats but reverses the subject, so the coup de théâtre effected by the comic figure sets into motion a reversal in the dramatic world which echoes through the multiple layers of the work: structural (the inversion of the epilogue and prologue), actional (the exchange of roles between the spectator and the actor) and thematic (the inversion of the master-slave relation in all its permutations [el IV,i.2]). Ludwig Tieck (1963). The translations are mine.
26 Kimberly Benston (1992,441).

Works cited
Green, Lawrence. 1984. «'We'll dress him up in voices': The Rhetoric of *Disjunction* in *Troilus and Cressida*.» *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70: 23-40.


