Idealists Variations: Schopenhauer, the “Thing in Itself,” and the Problem of Negation

Abstract

Two hundred years after the appearance of The World as Will and Representation, talking about Schopenhauer as a member of the German philosophical tradition known as German idealism continues to be a desideratum. The philosopher himself claimed to be a legitimate heir of Kantian philosophy, which is, among other things, the great philosophical pillar of German idealism. Not only does he claim to be its heir but, as the very idealists did, he also tried to reformulate or neutralize the problem regarding the “thing-in-itself”. This paper will analyze the strategy followed by Schopenhauer to reformulate said problematic. The strategy at issue is a double understanding of negation: negation embodied by that which Schopenhauer calls phenomenon, and the negation of will. The characterization of both types of negation will allow a clearer idea of Schopenhauer’s place in the debate, specifically post-Kantian, on the “thing-in-itself” or the unconditioned (das Unbedingt).