Russell y Wittgenstein: sobre contradicciones y paradojas

Contenido principal del artículo

Alejandro Tomasini

Resumen

In this essay I present and contrast Bertrand Russell’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views on the subject of paradoxes and try to show how and why, from Wittgenstein’s perspective, the difficulties that contradictions raise are rather pseudo-problems and, accordingly, what we need to get rid of them is not a theory but a grammatical analysis of the concepts involved.

Detalles del artículo

Cómo citar
Tomasini, A. (2002). Russell y Wittgenstein: sobre contradicciones y paradojas. Theoría. Revista Del Colegio De Filosofía, (13), 83–99. https://doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2002.13.287
Sección
Sobre Wittgenstein