Una posible respuesta de Ch. S. Peirce al problema tradicional de la inducción

Resumen

Ch. S. Peirce recognizes induction as one of the three moments of the scientific method. This means that he thought that the induction was, in a way, justified. In this paper I intend to review what Peirce’s response might be to the traditional problem of induction, namely, the problem of justifying a general principle of inductive inferences. This principle is traditionally characterized as the Principle of uniformity of nature (PU). Particularly, then, I am interested in evaluating Peirce’s opinion regarding the justification of a PU version, namely, the Principle of regularity of nature (PR). The work is composed of three sections, the first will present a version of the argument that gives rise to the traditional problem of induction; in the second, a reconstruction of the characterization of Peirce’s PR
will be offered; and in the third, it will be reviewed in which way for Peirce the PR could be justified—which would seem to solve Hume’s problem; finally, in the fourth section, as a conclusion, a brief evaluation of this possible answer of Peirce to Hume’s problem will be offered.