The Ethical Perspective in the Commentaries of Cardinal Cajetan

Abstract

This paper presents the change of the ethical perspective present in Cajetan’s commentaries to S. Th. II-II, qq. 57-62. In addition to the logical-philosophical distance with Aquinas, who defines the virtue of justice with an analogy of intrinsic attribution, the Cardinal, who does so through univocity, shifts from an ethics of virtue—a first-person ethics—to an ethic of obligation—a third person ethics—through prescription and imposed obedience (formalism, voluntarism). The result of the distance between both ethics is not only the trispecification of justice—which is also presented in addition to its theoretical-practical implications—but also the open path that it leaves for later philosophical-political ideas that will end up generating liberal reflections within the same Thomism. Although we will not focus on them here, we do put one of the milestones that have favored them: the change of ethical perspective.