A Transcendental Argument for a Located Technofeminism

Abstract

Xenofeminism is a technofeminist action project opposed to any form of local naturalism, whose proposal is based on the idea of an unlimited subjectivity. On the other hand, feminist epistemologies—I refer specifically to Donna Haraway’s position—argue that it is necessary to affirm the locality of knowledge to avoid the production of sexist science and technologies. In this text I review the assumptions underlying this supposed dichotomy. I argue that the discussion at the heart of the dichotomy revolves around the idea of natural substances or types. According to this debate, assuming a position of localized feminism implies being against any naturalistic argument. To defend this idea, I turn to the form of the transcendental argument in the context of F. W. J. Schelling’s late philosophy. Based on Iain Hamilton Grant’s critique of transcendental naturalism, I defend the necessity of a localized subjectivity. I claim that it is not necessary to be a biologicist essentialist to assert the need for situated technofeminist thought. Not every critique of situated thought must affirm an unbounded subjectivity. At the end of this text, I point toward the possibility of a transcendental argument for the necessity of a situated technofeminism.