Dos formas de escepticismo semántico
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Abstract
The author distinguishes and compares two varieties of semantic skepticism. The first one, called scientific, is found in W. O. Quine’s intention of accounting for language —conveniently organized in purely extensional terms— as a complex of dispositions in verbal behavior. The second variety is present, according to this paper, in the Wittgensteinian problematic of following a rule. The author sustains that the basic weakness of the latter variety lies in its being based on a problematic theory —such as behaviorism; additionally, scientific semantic skepticism is open to the criticism that it cannot account of the normative aspect of linguistic practices.
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How to Cite
Smith, P. J. (2002). Dos formas de escepticismo semántico. Theoría. Revista Del Colegio De Filosofía, (13), 101–117. https://doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2002.13.288
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Section
On Wittgenstein