El antiplatonismo del Tractatus de Wittgenstein

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Published: Sep 1, 2002
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2002.13.290
Keywords:
Reglas de inferencia, Wittgenstein, Sintaxis lógica, Objetos matemáticos, Sintaxis, Lógica, Inferencia

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Sílvio Pinto
Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Morelos

Abstract

This essay presents the framework of the early Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. The author shows how, by conceiving mathematical equations and tautologies as rules for the use of signs, the early Wittgenstein did not require postulating, or inventing, mathematical objects in order to explain the objective character of mathematical discourse.

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How to Cite
Pinto, S. (2002). El antiplatonismo del Tractatus de Wittgenstein. Theoría. Revista Del Colegio De Filosofía, (13), 137–152. https://doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2002.13.290
Issue
No. 13 (2002)
Section
On Wittgenstein